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Abstract: Andrew Feenberg’s political philosophy of technology uniquely connects 
the neo-Marxist tradition with phenomenological approaches to technology. This 
paper investigates how this connection shapes Feenberg’s analysis of power. Influ-
enced by De Certeau and by classical positions in philosophy of technology, Feenberg 
focuses on a dialectical model of oppression versus liberation. A hermeneutic reading 
of power, though, inspired by the late Foucault, does not conceptualize power rela-
tions as external threats, but rather as the networks of relations in which subjects are 
constituted. Such a hermeneutic approach replaces De Certeau’s tactics of resistance 
with a critical and creative accompaniment of technological developments.
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1. Introduction
Phenomenology and Marxism have always had a complicated relationship. When 
asked about the possible contributions of philosophy to social change, in a famous 
television interview with Richard Wisser, Martin Heidegger replied with a sharp 
critique of Karl Marx. In his Theses on Feuerbach, Marx stated that “philosophers 
have only interpreted the world; what matters is to change it” (Marx 2000: 174). 
And against this, Heidegger showed that this statement ignores that it is in fact 
based upon a very specific understanding of the world itself: it presupposes that 
the world is makeable and changeable. For phenomenologists, Marxism overlooks 
the hermeneutic dimensions of human existence; for Marxists, phenomenology is 
politically ignorant.
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Andrew Feenberg is one of the very few scholars who successfully manage 
to connect these two traditions. Firmly rooted in neo-Marxism, he critically inte-
grates phenomenological analyses in his critical theory of technology, culminating 
in his study Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History 
(Feenberg 2005b). For Feenberg, political power and the cultural appropriation 
of technology are closely connected. In his view, technology involves both a de-
contextualization and a recontextualization: while it detaches entities from their 
context in order to use them in a functional way, the resulting technologies are 
always recontextualized when they acquire a place in society. Both aspects need 
to be addressed in philosophy of technology. Moreover, because of his contextual 
and empirical approach to technology (cf. Achterhuis 2001), for Feenberg tech-
nology is never problematic in itself but only in its concrete workings. And this 
connects closely to contemporary approaches in philosophy of technology that 
focus on actual technologies and their social and cultural implications, rather than 
‘Technology,’ as a broad social and cultural phenomenon. For Feenberg, then, the 
task of a political philosophy of technology is not to criticize technology as such, 
but to find an alternative technological rationality and materiality.
In this article, I will address the question of how to arrive at such an ‘alterna-
tive technology,’ engaging in a critical way with Feenberg’s approach. The central 
point of discussion will be the conceptualization of the relations between technol-
ogy and society that supports and guides political analyses of technology. With a 
nod to Heidegger’s critique of Marx, I will discuss the basic understanding of the 
human-technology relation that underlies the neo-Marxist approach to technology. 
Against the neo-Marxist dialectical model of a struggle between technology and 
society, focusing on oppression and liberation, I will propose a phenomenological 
model in which humanity and technology are closely intertwined, and in which 
technology helps to shape frameworks of meaning and interpretation.
At the background of this discussion, as will become clear below, is the ques-
tion of modernity. While a critical theory of technology strives for the develop-
ment of an alternative modernity, the phenomenological approach indicated above 
rather results in a nonmodern framework, inspired by contemporary approaches 
such as Postphenomenology and Actor-Network Theory. Such a framework does 
not take a sharp division between human subjects and technological objects as its 
starting point, but focuses on their interwoven character. This discussion will, fi-
nally, lead us to the question of how to do politics with this nonmodern alternative 
to critical theory. I will address this question by expanding Feenberg’s analysis 
of the democratization of technology. In addition to the reorganization of power 
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relations, I will propose a ‘democratic accompaniment’ of technological develop-
ments, in which the reintroduction of the question of the good life in the public 
sphere has a central place.
2. Criticizing Critical Theory
Domination and Resistance
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology integrates classical Marxist ‘technology 
critique’ with contemporary empirical and contextual approaches to technology. 
Rather than addressing ‘Technology,’ as a broad social and cultural phenomenon, 
he addresses actual technologies and their political workings. For Feenberg, tech-
nology is a thoroughly political phenomenon. Not because it provides the infra-
structure for industrialization, as classical Marxism would have it, but because it 
embodies political interests, ideologies, and power relations. Feenberg developed 
the concept of the “technical code” to explain this. A technical code, in his own 
words, is “the realization of an interest or ideology in a technically coherent solu-
tion to a problem” (Feenberg 2005a: 52). Such codes are not always explicitly 
formulated by designers; most often they come about implicitly:
Although some technical codes are formulated explicitly by technologists 
themselves, I am seeking a more general analytic tool that can be applied 
even in the absence of such formulations. More precisely, then, a technical 
code is a criterion that selects between alternative feasible technical de-
signs in terms of a social goal. “Feasible” here means technically workable. 
Goals are “coded” in the sense of ranking items as ethically permitted or 
forbidden, or aesthetically better or worse, or more or less socially desir-
able. (Feenberg 2005a: 52)
The heart of Feenberg’s analysis is formed by his theory of instrumental-
ization. For Feenberg, instrumentalization is the essential characteristic of tech-
nology. Instrumentalization has two manifestations: there are two ways in which 
technology turns entities into instruments, which Feenberg calls “primary” and 
“secondary” instrumentalization. Primary instrumentalization consists in “the 
functional constitution of technical objects and subjects”: technology approaches 
both human and nonhuman entities in terms of the function they could have. 
Secondary instrumentalization is “the realization of the constituted objects and 
subjects in actual networks and devices” (Feenberg 1999: 202): it occurs when 
instruments take on a specific social and cultural role, and become part of relations 
with human beings.
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The first form of instrumentalization, in Feenberg’s analysis, decontextual-
izes and reduces subjects and objects to the functions they can have in a tech-
nical system, as analyzed in various ways by Marx, Habermas, and Heidegger 
(cf. Feenberg 2005a: 50). Technological development requires a reduction of 
humans and things to ‘raw material’ with functional properties. The second form 
of instrumentalization consists in a recontextualization of entities, placing them 
back in the “dimensions of reality from which the primary instrumentalization 
abstracts” (Feenberg 1999: 205). Here, the focus is on how technologies become 
part of networks of relations, and take on mediating roles in people’s practices 
and experiences. After the reductionism of primary instrumentalization, secondary 
instrumentalization brings in complexity, embodying an entirely different politi-
cal dimension of technology. Besides a functionalization of humans and things—
which can easily develop into exploitation—technology also generates new forms 
of meaning and organizes new practices and experiences. At this level, there is 
also creative appropriation of technology, in which human beings use and embed 
technologies in unexpected or even subversive ways.
For Feenberg, the current technological configuration of our society is deeply 
problematic. Feenberg shares Marx’s analysis that our capitalist, industrial society 
“orients technological development toward disempowering workers and the mas-
sification of the public” (Feenberg 2005a: 53). Feenberg calls this control over the 
labor process “operational autonomy,” which he defines as “the freedom of the 
owner or his representative to make independent decisions about how to carry on 
the business of the organization, regardless of the views or interests of subordinate 
actors and the surrounding community” (ibid.). This autonomy gives the managers 
a safe position, far away from the consequences of their decisions, from which 
they can “reproduce the conditions of their own supremacy at each iteration of 
the technologies they command.” This situation ultimately results in technocracy, 
when “technology and management spread to every sector of social life” (Feen-
berg 2005a: 55).
Yet, technology can take another direction. “What can be done to reverse 
the tide?” Feenberg asks, immediately answering that “only the democratization 
of technology can help.” Democratic movements can create “alliances of actors” 
which make sure that the consequences of the actions taken are also experienced 
by the people making the decisions. In this way, agency is restored to “those treated 
as objects of management in the dominant technical code” (Feenberg 2005a: 55).
In his democratization theory, Feenberg clearly shows his dialectic roots: it 
primarily comes down to resistance. “Subordinate actors,” he says, “must inter-
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vene in a different way from dominant ones” (Feenberg 2005a: 55). In order to 
elaborate this, Feenberg bases himself on Michel De Certeau—more specifically, 
on De Certeau’s interpretation of Michel Foucault. De Certeau makes a distinction 
between “strategies” and “tactics.” Strategies belong to institutional groups that 
have the power to actually develop a strategy, whereas tactics belong to those 
“subject to that power and who, lacking a base for acting continuously and legiti-
mately, maneuver and improvise micropolitical resistances” (ibid.).
For Feenberg, the level of tactics is by far the most interesting. Tactics are 
the antidote to domination; they are the medium of resistance, because they equip 
people with the means to counter the dominating and exploiting effects of tech-
nology. While strategies belong to the realm of decontextualization and primary 
instrumentalization, tactics are forms of secondary instrumentalization. They are 
in the realm of recontextualization, giving new roles and meaning to technologies, 
and thus rewriting the technological code (Feenberg 2005a: 55–59).
From Dialectics to Hermeneutics
The importance of Feenberg’s critical theory of technology cannot be overesti-
mated. His work offers many points of application for political action and for 
the further development of a political theory of technology. Yet, from a (post)
phenomenological point of view there is also a problem with Feenberg’s concep-
tualization of the relations between technology and society. The basic model of 
these relations in his work, from his dialectical neo-Marxist approach, is that of a 
struggle. Technology and society are conceptualized as two separate realms, and 
the role of democracy is to make sure that the power is with the people, not with 
technology. If technology invades too deeply into the human sphere, practices of 
resistance and subversion are needed to push it back into its own realm. The logic 
of primary instrumentalization is a logic of technology, while the logic of second-
ary instrumentalization is human—and the first should not overrule the second.
This struggle-model rests upon a conceptualization of human-technology 
relations that is highly contestable. Contemporary approaches like Actor-Network 
Theory and Postphenomenology convincingly argue that humans and technolo-
gies are closely intertwined, and can only be conceptualized in their interrelations. 
Don Ihde’s postphenomenological approach to technology, for instance, focuses 
on human-technology associations, rather than technologies themselves. By ana-
lyzing the character of the various shapes these human-technology relations can 
take, Ihde unravels how technologies help to shape human interpretations and 
practices (Ihde 1990). Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory works along com-
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parable lines. In order to understand reality, Latour claims, we need to give up 
the a priori separation we make between human and nonhuman beings. Human 
‘subjects’ and nonhuman ‘objects’ are always intertwined, and the networks of 
relations between them produce the world in which we live (Latour 1993). The 
French philosopher Bernard Stiegler even speaks about an “originary technicity” 
of human existence: human existence has always taken shape in close interaction 
with technologies (Stiegler 1998).
The human being cannot be understood in isolation from technology, just as 
technology cannot be understood in isolation from humanity. Conceptualizing this 
relation in terms of struggle and oppression is like seeking resistance against grav-
ity, or language. Technology helps to shape what it means to be human. This does 
not imply, of course, that all roles of technology in human existence are equally 
desirable, and that human beings are in fact powerless victims of the power of 
technology. But it does imply that the model of oppression and resistance might 
not be the most productive model if one wants to change undesirable configura-
tions of humans and technologies.
If there is a struggle between humans and technologies at all, as I will show 
later, it should rather be conceptualized in the way Heidegger conceptualized art-
works as a struggle between “earth” and “world.” A work of art, Heidegger argues 
in The Origin of the Work of Art, brings a world into being on the basis of “earthly” 
elements, like cloth and paint, bronze, vibrations of the air, et cetera (Heidegger 
1971). Experiencing a work of art is experiencing the coming into being of a 
world, out of these material elements. Watching Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of 
peasant shoes, in Heidegger’s well-known example, sets into motion a “struggle” 
between the cloth and the pigment on the one hand, and the reality of the pair of 
shoes that arises out of these material elements on the other. In this struggle, there 
is no oppression and liberation, but interaction and mutual shaping. It would be 
strange to say that the paint oppresses the shoes, or the other way round: the two 
are necessarily connected. Similarly, forms of human existence and arrangements 
of society are “revealed” in the relations between technological materialities and 
the human beings who design, organize, and use them.
An example may serve to illustrate the differences between these positions. 
From a dialectical perspective, a technology like Facebook can appear as a threat 
to society. After all, it embodies the power of a few mighty people who earn a lot 
of money by analyzing our personal profiles and selling these analyses to advertis-
ers. Moreover, Facebook can be seen as a threat to the quality of social relations, 
because it makes us shallow (Carr 2011) and consumerist (Borgmann 1984, 1999). 
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If the basic model is a model of oppression, the only answer can be to reverse the 
tide, in more or less radical ways. Forms of resistance can range from activist 
attempts to hack the Facebook website, to developing alternative digital social 
networks in which the power is not with a small elite but with the entire commu-
nity of users. Also, people could be educated about the effects of Facebook on the 
quality of the social relations they are involved in, in order to be able to develop a 
critical relation to it.
From a (post)phenomenological perspective, though, the opposition model 
needs to be overcome. For mediation theorists, Facebook is simply one of the 
media through which friendship can take shape, just like real-life conversations, 
letters, or e-mails. All of these media establish radically different types of rela-
tions—but these relations are typically the basis of new forms of friendship, not 
the end of it. Rather than alienating people from each other, Facebook mediates 
their relations, offering new ways of interaction. These need not always be desir-
able—but the central idea is that, when integrated in people’s everyday lives, tech-
nologies like Facebook do not function as technological invasions alien to human 
existence, but as the very media of human existence. To be sure, there are powers 
of capitalism behind it, and Facebook is performing a “primary instrumentaliza-
tion” of its users in order to make money out of their social interactions. But seeing 
this as a situation of oppression to which resistance is the only answer—which is 
the model one ends up with by embracing De Certeau’s distinction between the 
strategies of the powerful and the tactics of the overpowered to analyze technol-
ogy—would not do justice to the complexity of the social and cultural roles of 
Facebook. Rather than developing tactics to counter the strategies of dominat-
ing powers, citizens in a technological world should develop techniques to give a 
desirable shape to their technologically mediated existence and to organize their 
technological society. This does not take away the importance of countering the 
power of the big companies if these would form a threat to society. But it shows 
that an exclusive focus on the dialectics of oppression and liberation leaves crucial 
social and cultural aspects of technology untouched.
Technologies of the Self
In order to arrive at such an approach, an alternative to De Certeau’s reading of 
Foucault is needed. The foundations for such a reading of Foucault are laid in the 
recent work of Steven Dorrestijn (Dorrestijn 2012). Dorrestijn reads Foucault’s 
work on power through the lens of his later work on ethics. While Foucault’s 
earlier work focuses on the normalizing workings of specific forces and structures 
Toward a Non-Modern Democratization of Technology 79
in society, the last two volumes of his History of Sexuality can be read as an in-
vestigation into how human beings can shape their existence in interaction with 
these power structures. Instead of being the objects of power, humans then appear 
as subjects who develop a productive interaction with the powers that be. This 
makes it possible to further develop the idea that the struggle between humans 
and technologies is not oppressive but productive, as I pointed out on the basis of 
Heidegger’s philosophy of art. Michel Foucault, indeed, approaches human exis-
tence itself as a work of art, that takes shape in a creative interaction with power 
structures—his ethics concerns “the art of living” (O’Leary 2002).
Foucault’s work on power shows how modern society, ever since the En-
lightenment, has not only produced a modern subject that has come to see itself as 
‘autonomous,’ but also a series of implicit power structures that make the subject 
much less autonomous than it might seem to be. Hospitals, prisons, and schools 
have a normalizing power: they implicitly determine how human beings are sup-
posed to live, and what is normal and abnormal. Quite often, as De Certeau’s posi-
tion illustrates, Foucault’s work on power is read in a dialectical way: as a story 
about oppression and liberation. And, obviously, this interpretation matches nicely 
with neo-Marxist approaches. Oppression is there to be resisted: political activ-
ity should aim to develop counterprograms against oppressive power structures; 
subversive practices should restore power to the oppressed. As we saw, Feenberg’s 
proposal to democratize technology takes place exactly along these lines. By tak-
ing sides with De Certeau, Feenberg adopts a model of power in which technology 
oppresses human beings, and tactics need to be developed to resist this oppression.
Foucault’s later work adopts an entirely different relation to power. Rather 
than resisting power structures, it approaches them as “sources of the self,” if I may 
borrow Taylor’s expression (Taylor 1989). Power structures are not alien to human 
beings, but form the basis of our existence. Rather than resisting them, we need to 
develop productive interactions with them. Such productive interactions Foucault 
calls “self-practices,” or even “technologies of the self” (Foucault 1997a: 223–52). 
He discovered them particularly in the ethics of sexuality in ancient Greece. There 
and then, sexuality was not approached so much in terms of inhibitions and ob-
ligations, but in terms of ‘styling’ oneself as a sexual subject. In dealing with the 
passions, the main question was not what was allowed and what not, but how to 
find a good way of dealing with them. Put in my own words: giving the passions 
not enough space would be denying a part of oneself, while giving them too much 
space would make humans their slaves, which would also result in losing oneself.
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The ethics of sexuality, therefore, was the art of living a life-with-passions. 
Rather than being an external invader, the passions were considered to be constitu-
tive for human existence—not in the sense that they determine us, but in the sense 
that they urge us to govern them. Ethical activity was not directed at a liberation 
from oppressive powers, but at developing a free relation to these powers. Not 
making oneself free from power, as an autonomous subject, was the central aim, 
but engaging in a free relation with these powers, by understanding their work-
ings and getting involved in the ways they have an impact on one’s subjectivity. 
Between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ it was looking for a ‘how.’
Making Foucault’s approach of the “technologies of the self” fruitful for a 
political philosophy of technology requires some translation work, as the work of 
Steven Dorrestijn shows (Dorrestijn 2006). Just like the passions, technologies 
have a continuous impact upon us. The art of living in a technological culture, 
then, is the art of giving a desirable shape to one’s technologically mediated sub-
jectivity, and to the organization of our technological society. Instead of focusing 
on the question of which technologies are acceptable and which are not, the main 
task is to ask ourselves how we want to shape our relations with technologies. And 
instead of developing the tactics of resistance, we need tactics of “subjectivation.”
This translation of Foucault’s revival of classical Greek ethics makes clear 
that acknowledging the fundamental intertwinement of technology and society 
does not require us to give up on politics. Yet, at the same time it is far from self-
evident what a political philosophy of technology could be when it bases itself on 
the fundamentally technologically mediated character of human existence. If there 
is no ‘external’ position from which to ‘criticize’ technology, but only a position 
‘from within,’ what can politics be? Doesn’t this position boil down to surrender 
before the struggle? In what follows, I will argue that the opposite is true. Building 
upon Foucault’s concept of the “limit-attitude” I will show that democratization 
does not need to take the shape of external critique but can also be a form of ac-
companying technology.
3. From Critique to Governance
How to do political theory of technology if critique cannot be the model? In the 
symmetrical approach of Bruno Latour, in which human and nonhuman entities 
play equal roles, and in the mediation approach of Postphenomenology, where 
human practices and experiences are always technologically mediated, there does 
not seem to be an ‘outside’ position anymore with respect to technology. And if 
there is no outside anymore, from where could we criticize technology?
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Here, it is very helpful to connect to Foucault’s approach to the phenomenon 
of ‘critique’ in his lecture “What is Enlightenment?” (Foucault 1997b). In this text, 
Foucault is looking for an answer to what he calls “the blackmail of the Enlighten-
ment.” This blackmail consists in the fact that it is extremely hard to criticize the 
Enlightenment, since all attempts to do so are typically explained as being against 
it. Anyone who dares to do open a discussion about the Enlightenment raises the 
suspicion of being against rationality, democracy, and scientific inquiry. Foucault, 
however, wants to explore if an alternative Enlightenment would be possible—
much like Feenberg’s attempt to formulate an “alternative modernity.”
As the title suggests, Foucault’s text is primarily occupied with the work of 
Immanuel Kant. In fact, it proposes an empirical and practical reinterpretation of 
Kant’s ideas on the Enlightenment. Rather than aiming at a transcendental ap-
proach, which focuses on non-empirical conditions of possibility, Foucault rein-
terprets the Enlightenment as an attitude. For Kant, Enlightenment was a way out 
of “immaturity,” using “reason” rather than accepting “someone else’s authority to 
lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for” (Foucault 1997b: 305). This 
requires critique: critique can tell us under which conditions “the use of reason is 
legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what 
may be hoped” (Foucault 1997b: 308). Such critique, according to Foucault, must 
be understood as an attitude, an “ethos.” This attitude is always looking for the 
limits of what seems to be given and self-evident.
Foucault calls this Enlightenment attitude a “limit-attitude.” This limit-
attitude is looking for “the singular, the contingent, and the product of arbitrary 
constraints” in “what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory” (Foucault 
1997b: 315). And while Kant’s transcendental method was looking for formal 
limits, Foucault is looking for the historical sources of our current situation: “criti-
cism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with 
universal value, but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have 
led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are 
doing, thinking, saying” (ibid.). Critique, as ‘enlightened’ activity par excellence, 
then becomes a form of practical self-inquiry: investigating what has made us the 
beings that we are. This also relates to the modern self-understanding of the au-
tonomous subject. The limit-attitude makes visible that this self-understanding has 
a history, and therefore it also shows that other forms of subjectivity are possible 
than that of the autonomous subject.
Foucault’s ideas about critique as limit-attitude could inspire an alternative 
‘critical theory’ of technology. What sets the limit-attitude apart from other forms 
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of critique is the way it positions itself. While critique places itself outside of 
the phenomena it relates to, for the limit-attitude there is no outside. The human 
subject is always situated within the world to which it has a relation. In Foucault’s 
words: “We have to move beyond the inside-outside alternative; we have to be at 
the frontiers” (Foucault 1997b: 315). In the context of technology this means that 
the frameworks from which one can criticize technology are technologically medi-
ated themselves. We can never step out of these mediations. The farthest we can 
get is: to the limits of the situation we are in. Standing at the borders, recognizing 
the technologically mediated character of our existence and our interpretations, we 
can investigate the nature and the quality of these mediations: where do they come 
from, what do they do, could they be different? Not the transcendental conditions 
of our existence outside the empirical world are central in this form of ‘critique,’ 
but the material-historical ‘sources of the technological self.’
As such, the Foucauldian limit-attitude provides a ‘way out’ of the ques-
tion as to whether political reflection and action are still possible when we adopt 
the symmetrical approach of Latour or the mediation approach of Ihde. Rather 
than letting ourselves be blackmailed by the Enlightenment—fearing that a non-
modern conceptualization of technology and society as interwoven would make it 
impossible to have a reasonable and normative discussion about technology—the 
alternatively-enlightened “limit approach” can offer a different, nonmodern po-
litical approach to technology. Not the assessment of technological developments 
from outside is the central goal of political action and theory then, but rather its 
accompaniment, ‘from within,’ borrowing a concept from the Belgian philosopher 
Gilbert Hottois (Hottois 1996).
The crucial question in such a politics of accompaniment is not so much 
where we have to draw a boundary between human beings on the one hand and 
technologies on the other. It rather is how we should give shape to the interrelated-
ness between humans and technology, which has in fact always been a central 
characteristic of human existence. The limit-attitude leads to a political theory 
that is not preoccupied with the question of whether a given technology is mor-
ally acceptable or not, but that is directed at the quality of our lives, as lived with 
technology.
Focusing on the close relations between human beings and technologies does 
not mean, to be sure, that all relations are equally desirable, and that no critical 
perspective of technology is possible anymore. Rather it implies that politics needs 
to engage deeply with actual practices of design, use, and implementation. Giv-
ing up an external position does not make us give up all critical distance; it only 
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makes sure that we do not overestimate the distance we can take. The Foucauldian 
limit-attitude urges us to develop a ‘critique’ from within, engaging with how 
technological practices actually take shape, and from a situation that is technologi-
cally mediated itself.
In line with the work of Michel Foucault, this ‘technology accompaniment’ 
can be seen as a form of “governance.” By deliberately shaping one’s involvement 
with technology and with the impact technology can have on one’s existence, it 
becomes possible to give direction to one’s technologically mediated subjectivity. 
Governance needs to be distinguished sharply from ‘steering.’ Governing tech-
nological developments implies a recognition of their own, distinctive dynamics, 
and of the relatively limited autonomy human beings have in their relations to 
technology. The phenomenological approach to technology that I indicated above, 
in opposition to a dialectical approach, entails precisely that human beings are 
‘implied’ in technological developments, just like technologies are ‘implied’ in 
human existence. From such a phenomenological point of view, the modernist 
ambition to ‘steer’ technology and to ‘protect’ humanity against technological 
invasions needs to be replaced with a more modest ambition to govern the devel-
opment of technology by taking its social implications into account, and to govern 
one’s subjectivity in relation to those technologies.
4. Alternative Democratization: Governing the Power of Technology
Feenberg’s way out of the threat of technocracy is a democratization of technology, 
as explained above. The strategies of the powerful need to be countered with the 
tactics of the oppressed. The functionalizing impact of primary instrumentalization 
can only be balanced by the meaningful activities of secondary instrumentaliza-
tion. Technocracy or democracy, these seem to be the alternatives that Feenberg’s 
approach has to offer. And in this way, Feenberg’s approach takes us right back to 
Foucault’s “blackmail of the Enlightenment”: not opting for a democratization of 
technology implies signing up for technocracy.
Yet, this is a false dilemma—just like the “blackmail of the Enlightenment” 
was. Feenberg’s “tactical” elaboration of the democratization of technology, based 
on De Certeau, is not the only way to avoid technocracy. The struggle model behind 
it, as we saw, does not do enough justice to the thoroughly interwoven character of 
humanity and technology. And this is where the importance of a phenomenologi-
cal approach to power came in.
A phenomenological approach to power shows that non-technocratic forms 
of engagement with technologies involve much more than the tactics of resistance. 
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As is implied in Feenberg’s own concept of secondary instrumentalization, human 
beings can also develop creative reinterpretations of technologies, and shape their 
existence in a productive interaction with technological mediations. Such deal-
ings with technologies do not embody resistance but confidence—understood as 
elaborated above. And rather than tactics they involve “technologies of the self,” 
which aim at governing technological developments rather than steering or resist-
ing them.
Elsewhere I have explained this approach in terms of trust (Kiran and Ver-
beek 2011). Often, political discussions about technology revolve around trust in 
technology, moving between the extremes of relying on technology versus being 
suspicious of it. A naïve instrumentalist view of technology blindly trusts that 
technological instruments will realize the goals they were designed for, while a 
skeptical and suspicious view distrusts the workings of technologies. While the 
model of reliance is characteristic for technocratic politics—putting all faith in 
technology—the model of suspicion is characteristic for (neo-)Marxist approaches 
that fear technocratic threat to democracy.
Against these two opposite approaches, a third form of trust exists in relation 
to technology. This could be called confidence, and it involves trusting oneself to 
technology. Rather than being suspicious of technology, this approach recognizes 
the fact that human existence takes shape in close interaction with technologies. 
But rather than trusting technology blindly, ‘succumbing’ to it, it sees the inter-
woven character of humanity and technology as a task, as something that requires 
work. Trusting oneself to technology comes down to taking responsibility for 
one’s technologically mediated existence, in a technological society.
From Subversive Technology to Technologies of the Self
One of the most well-known case studies Feenberg worked on is the Minitel case 
in France. Minitel was an information retrieval system, introduced in the 1980s, 
that used the telephone line to connect citizens to central databases, enabling to 
look up all kinds of information that might be useful. Users of the system, though, 
appeared not to be very interested in this centralized system, and mainly used it 
to consult the phone directory, until hackers transformed the system radically, and 
made it possible to use it for the exchange of messages. From then on, the system 
became very popular—but it did not resemble at all the system that was originally 
designed. By creatively appropriating and redefining the system, users had actu-
ally succeeded in changing the technological system entirely (Feenberg 1995).
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In Feenberg’s analysis, this case study is a story about the victory of the people 
against the elite. The reconfiguration of Minitel into a communication system is a 
modest form of rebellion. By refusing the rules set by the elite, and by creatively 
developing a counternarrative and a counterdesign, the oppressive strategy of the 
powerful was frustrated by the powerless. Even though I am very sympathetic to 
Feenberg’s efforts to debunk deterministic approaches to technology, I think that 
this model of struggle is not able to cover all politically relevant aspects of the 
interactions between humans and technologies. The actual impact of the Minitel 
system remains out of sight in this model of oppression-versus-resistance—after 
all, it was the ‘reconfigured’ Minitel system that introduced new forms of interac-
tion and communication, and therefore it is this impact that deserves normative 
reflection in the first place.
Here, we need to augment Feenberg’s analysis. From a phenomenological 
point of view, the most relevant thing to study here is how communication media 
like Minitel have an impact on the quality of our daily lives. And that is exactly 
what the theory of technical mediation, as developed in the context of ‘postphe-
nomenological’ studies of human-technology relations (cf. Ihde 1990; Verbeek 
2005), is concerned with. From the perspective of this postphenomenological 
theory, the impact of computer-mediated communication should not be reduced to 
the ideology from which it comes, but should be studied in terms of the material 
mediation of people’s experiences and practices. Rather than seeing a technocratic 
ideology installed through technologies that reduce personal communication to 
functional interaction, mediation theory investigates how new communication 
media have specific amplifying and reducing workings with respect to the ways in 
which human beings can be present to each other. From this perspective, political 
activities regarding technologies should not so exclusively focus on breaking the 
power of the elite, but on shaping the quality of our lives-with-technologies.
Let me illustrate this with another example of government regulation of tech-
nology—an example that I have discussed in earlier publications from an ethical 
perspective and that I would like to give a political elaboration here: the use of 
obstetric ultrasound in antenatal diagnostics (Verbeek 2008a, 2008b). Over the 
past decade, it has become very normal—also in the Foucauldian sense of the 
word—to have several sonograms made during pregnancy. In the Netherlands, the 
typical situation at this moment is to have two scans made. One takes place around 
eleven or twelve weeks of pregnancy, to determine the term of the pregnancy and 
often also to calculate the risk of Down’s syndrome. The second sonogram is then 
made around twenty weeks of pregnancy, to scan the entire body of the fetus and 
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check its health condition. The second scan is included in the standard coverage of 
all insurance companies; the first scan is covered only in specific circumstances, 
but nevertheless virtually everybody chooses to have that scan done because it has 
become the standard ‘confirmation’ of pregnancy and the first visual encounter 
with the unborn.
In previous publications I have drawn attention to the ‘material morality’ 
that is embodied in such diagnostic technologies. Obstetric ultrasound helps to 
constitute the fetus and its parents in very specific ways: the fetus is constituted 
as a possible patient; congenital defects are constituted as preventable forms of 
suffering; and expecting a child is translated into choosing a child, also after the 
conception. But there is a political dimension to this technology that deserves 
attention too. The large-scale introduction of obstetric ultrasound has important 
implications for how we, as a society, deal with congenital diseases, and how 
we draw a line between a ‘normal’ and an ‘abnormal’ fetus. Even though there 
is a substantial group of people who choose not to abort a child with Down’s 
syndrome, it is becoming ever more normal to see Down’s syndrome not as a fate 
but as a preventable disease.
Also the twenty-week scan has important effects. It has been shown, for in-
stance, that since the introduction of this screening ever fewer babies with schisis 
(a ‘harelip’) are born. And one can imagine the reasons for this: at twenty weeks 
of pregnancy, a face with schisis looks terribly malformed, and one can hardly 
believe that surgery can indeed repair this very well. Still, this effect was not in-
tended at all when the Dutch parliament decided to introduce the twenty-week 
scan as a screening instrument.
In this example, Feenberg’s proposal for a democratization of technology 
reaches its limits. Even though a democratic decision was made about the intro-
duction of this technology, its actual impact on people’s everyday lives remained 
unaddressed. No proper analysis was made of the potential ways in which this 
mid-term screening could reorganize people’s experience of expecting a child, and 
the ways in which people feel responsible for the lives of their unborn children. 
For that reason, the screening is offered without a proper system that can support 
people in their decisions about participating in the screening program or not, and 
about what to do if the scan has specific outcomes.
If De Certeau’s reading of Foucault would be the only perspective available 
for political reflection, we would need to address this case in terms of a struggle 
between the strategy of the government or the medical system on the one hand, 
and the people on the other. Expecting parents then have the choice between fol-
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lowing the technocratic imperative and subjecting themselves to the screening 
program, or developing a tactics to counter this imperative and break the power of 
the system. The real decisions, though, concern the ways in which human beings 
deal with the screening system, how they shape themselves as expecting parents 
in interaction with the mediating power of this technology. What is needed here, 
is not a tactics to fight against the strategies of the powerful, but a repertoire of 
“technologies of the self,” to deal responsibly with the new ways in which antena-
tal diagnostic technologies help to shape pregnancy and the moral decisions that 
come with it.
There are more ways to deal with the availability of antenatal diagnostics 
than simply applying all of them, after all. The decision to use these technologies 
is also a decision to engage in a very specific relation with one’s unborn child. And 
such forms of engagement can be shaped in various ways. When expecting parents 
are aware of the potential impacts of diagnostic technologies, they can deliberately 
choose to give it a specific place in their existence. Sonograms can then result in 
different ‘styles of technologically mediated parenthood’: using sonograms only 
to determine the term of pregnancy, for instance, without getting any further in-
formation; or deliberately scanning for medical problems, in order to be prepared 
when the baby comes rather than to have an abortion, or in order to prevent one’s 
child from having to live a life full of suffering.
In order to shape one’s technologically mediated subjectivity, though, users 
need to be equipped adequately to develop a creative relation to the technolo-
gies that affect their lives. And that is, actually, what is often lacking. When the 
twenty-week ultrasound screening program was introduced in the Netherlands, for 
instance, the impact of this screening on practices and experiences regarding preg-
nancy was not adequately addressed. Rather than merely giving expecting parents 
information about the health condition of their unborn, the screening program 
created a new relation between parents and fetus, including new responsibilities 
and moral questions. And this requires an infrastructure to assist people in giving 
shape to this relation. Just like the Dutch healthcare system does for, say, pallia-
tive chemotherapy. For such treatments, there is a delicate balance between the 
quality of life and the expected impact on people’s life expectancy. Patients are 
extensively helped to make a balanced, personal decision here, shaping their own 
lives as cancer patients in relation to the technological means that are available. 
Technologies of the self have a social infrastructure here, as it were—and a similar 
infrastructure would be beneficial in the case of obstetric ultrasound as well.
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Restoring Public Discussions about the Good Life
Here, an alternative democratization of technology becomes visible. Democratiza-
tion does not need to consist solely in giving back the power to the people that 
technocracy took away from them. It can also consist in creating a public realm 
where people can deliberate about the ways in which they incorporate technolo-
gies in their daily lives.
The leading question for such a politics of ‘self-governance’ is: what is a 
good way of living a technologically mediated life? This is not a political ques-
tion that poses itself in opposition to technology, but a question that accompanies 
technological developments. It focuses on the quality of the relations between 
humans and technologies. But, more importantly, this approach also challenges 
modernist political thinking because of its focus on the question of the good life. 
The core of modernist political theory, after all, is precisely the expulsion of the 
question of the good life from the public realm. Ideas about the good life belong 
to the private realm; in the public realm we only discuss the rules that make it pos-
sible for everybody to answer the question of the good life individually. We would 
not want a church, state or monarch to answer that question for us. This political 
model makes possible a large plurality of visions of the good life, but at the price 
of a rather thin public discussion, in which any argument that bases itself explicitly 
on a vision of the good life is immediately put aside as irrelevant (Valkenburg 
2009). Technological developments take this liberalist ideal to its limits. Because 
of their explicit impact on the ways we live our lives, technologies keep putting the 
question of the good life right in front of us (cf. Borgmann 1984; Swierstra 2002). 
And if political discussions about technology keep referring that question to the 
private sphere, politics will never be able to address it adequately.
But is it possible to give the good life a new place in politics? Wouldn’t 
that be the end of democracy? The obvious objection against such a nonmodern 
political approach is that reintroducing the question of the good life in the public 
realm would threaten the liberal character of our society. But that would only be 
the case if politics would aim at organizing an overarching, uniform answer to the 
question of what makes a good life. When we follow Hannah Arendt’s interpreta-
tion of classical Greek politics, though, a completely different picture emerges. In 
her view, discussions of the good life in the classical polis were rooted in plurality 
(Arendt 1958). Not the desire to develop overarching frameworks was the drive 
behind political action, but inter-action: acting with others, shaping one’s exis-
tence in the encounter with others and with other ways of living one’s life.
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This is much in line with Foucault’s aesthetic interpretation of the ethics of 
the good life. For Foucault, ethics ultimately rested upon a choice of style—a style 
one gives to one’s moral subjectivity. Shaping one’s existence, then, resembles 
giving shape to a work of art. The good and the aesthetic coincide: kalos kaga-
thos, beautiful-and-good at once (O’Leary 2002: 53). One’s own existence can 
be demonstrated as an example of the ‘art of living,’ and other people’s lives can 
be approached like that as well. The role of the good life in politics, then, is not 
to enforce one specific way of the good life, but to organize a public exchange of 
visions of the good life.
This aesthetic interpretation of the good life, then, brings us back to Hei-
degger’s conceptualization of the work of art that I mentioned above. For Hei-
degger, as we saw, art is to be conceptualized as a struggle between earth and 
world. In this struggle, the material elements of the earth help to disclose a world. 
Similarly, the art of living one’s life can be seen as a struggle between technol-
ogy and human beings. In the ways in which human beings shape their existence 
in interaction with technological mediations, specific ways of living come about. 
And in the complex interplay between mediating technologies and their critical 
and creative users, human beings are “revealed” as specific beings with a specific 
existence. Shaping one’s technologically mediated subjectivity, therefore, is a 
form of art, and in the public realm people can learn from the ways in which other 
people master this ‘art of living.’ At the ethical level, this ‘art of living’ has often 
been connected to virtue ethics—where virtues can be seen as characteristics of 
human beings who master the art of living. On this basis, politics becomes nothing 
more or less than a public forum for encounters with various ways of living, and 
therefore with a plurality of answers to the question of the good life.
This phenomenological approach to the democratization of technology is a 
necessary addition to Feenberg’s neo-Marxist analysis. Power structures are ev-
erywhere, but the relations between humans and technologies cannot be exhaus-
tively analyzed in terms of power. If there is a struggle between technology and 
society, it is a struggle in which human beings are not only oppressed but also 
given a specific context for shaping their existence. And this implies that the poli-
tics of power and the politics of the good life augment each other in at least two 
ways. First, there is more at stake in politics than the distribution of power, just as 
there is more at stake than the encounter of various visions of the good life. And, 
second, political actions directed at a democratic distribution of power should also 
take into account how power relations enable human beings to shape their lives in 
interaction with technological mediations. A democratizing politics of technology, 
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therefore, should accompany technological developments, addressing how they 
raise questions about the good life and organizing a societal infrastructure for ad-
dressing these questions adequately. The liberalist focus of our liberal democracy 
would then be transformed into a pluralist focus. Not the autonomous individual 
that is to be liberated from oppressive forces is the center of politics then, but the 
plurality of visions of the good life. Democracy then realizes what its name actu-
ally indicated: power (kratos) to the people (demos), not to separate individuals.
5. Conclusion
Contemporary insights in the interwoven character of humanity and technology 
urge political philosophy of technology to move beyond the dialectical model of 
oppression versus liberation. Rather than conceptualizing the struggle between 
humans and technologies as oppressive, it needs to be understood as productive: 
human beings shape their existence by developing creative relations to mediating 
technologies.
If this struggle should be understood in a dialectical way at all, this should 
happen along the lines Nietzsche set out in Also sprach Zarathustra, in Zarathus-
tra’s lecture about “the metamorphoses of the spirit.” Zarathustra describes how 
the spirit began in the shape of a camel, bearing heavy loads and kneeling down to 
be loaded with more. After that, it took the shape of a lion, which defines itself in 
opposition to the camel, replacing the oppressive “Thou shalt” of the camel with a 
subversive “I will.” The lion, however, only defines itself in opposition to what it 
does not want to be, and therefore it is not able to create something new. For that, 
the spirit needs to take on a third shape: the shape of a child. The child embodies a 
“sacred Yes,” a “new beginning,” a “first movement” (Nietzsche 1969).
This Nietzschean parable can be a model for political philosophy of technol-
ogy. By freeing itself from the dialectical tension between oppressing technolo-
gies versus democratic liberation, political philosophy can achieve an alternative 
democratization of technology. Not only a redistribution of power, but also the 
question of the good life has a central place in this approach. From a political 
perspective, not only the threat of technocracy and oppressive elites is a relevant 
issue, but also the ways in which technologies raise questions regarding the good 
life. Technologies have a profound impact on the ways in which human beings 
live their lives, and deal with moral and political issues. A real technocracy comes 
about when technologies implicitly answer the question of the good life for human 
beings. Political action, therefore, needs to enable human beings to ‘read’ the in-
tricate connections they have with technologies, and to explicitly shape their exis-
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tence in interaction with these technologies. This requires a reintroduction of the 
question of the good life in the public realm. Not to impose one specific vision of 
the good life to society at large, but to equip people with a rich, plural context for 
answering the question of the good technologically mediated life. Phenomenology 
without politics is empty—with a nod to Kant, this time—but politics without 
phenomenology is blind.
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